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On the Deconstruction of Metaphysics: Heidegger’s Critical Ontology in
Being and Time
Marshall Pierce
Portland State University
Abstract: Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time offers a sustained critique of the Western
philosophical tradition. Specifically, Heidegger describes his project as a “deconstruction” of
prior ontological systems, whose goal is a positive recuperation and reformulation of the
“question of being.” This question, Heidegger suggests, has been obscured and distorted by prior
metaphysics. In Division One of Being and Time, Heidegger explicates his own ontology in a
critical mode, positioning himself against various canonical figures while forging his own, novel
conception of the “being of beings.” This paper offers a focused exposition of Being and Time’s
first Division, tracing the contours of Heidegger’s critical project while shedding light on his
reading of the history of Western metaphysics. Centering on Heidegger’s critical intervention in
ontology, the paper shows how Heidegger’s unique vision emerged through a complex
engagement with Aristotelian and Cartesian thought.

Introduction
In a letter to Karl Löwith dated February 20, 1923, Martin Heidegger described the
conclusion of the seminar he had offered the previous year on the seminal work of his esteemed
mentor, Edmund Husserl: “In the final hour […], I publicly burned and destroyed the Ideas to
such an extent that I dare say the essential foundations for the whole [of my work] are now
cleanly laid out” (quoted in Kiesel and Sheehan, 2007, p. 372). Later remarking to the same
Löwith that this experience secured him “completely on [his] own feet,” Heidegger indicated the
extent to which his own philosophical journey was intimately entangled with a critical project
and posture: the “essential foundations” of the pupil’s work were “laid out” in precisely the same
moment that he “burned and destroyed” his master’s system (Ibid.). It should come as little
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surprise, then, that with the publication of his magnum opus only four years later, Heidegger
would deliver a sustained and probing critique of Western metaphysics; he framed his whole
project in Being and Time as a “deconstruction,” or “destruction” (Destruktion) of prior
ontology, with an eye toward a positive reformulation of the “question of being” (Heidegger,
2010, p. 22). Heidegger’s metaphysics is delineated point by point in a critical or contrapuntal
mode,1 positioned against the work various canonical figures; it is by means of critique that
Heidegger forged his own, novel conception of the “being of beings” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 8).
The purpose of the present study is to draw out the critical dimension of Heidegger’s
approach in Being and Time’s first Division. Rather than offering a reconstruction of the entire
work, the study limits itself to an exposition of precisely those points at which Heidegger is
engaged—explicitly or otherwise—with the two figures who emerge as his privileged objects of
critique, namely Descartes and Aristotle. This study’s first objective—and the substance of its
first section—is to familiarize the reader with Aristotle’s and Descartes’s views insofar as they
form the background upon which Heidegger critically constructs Being and Time’s first Division.
The study’s second objective—and the matter of its second section—is to demonstrate the
substance of Heidegger’s critique and the positive aspects of his critical ontology. Heidegger
treats Aristotelian and Cartesian ontology as paradigms which more or less circumscribe all
subsequent ontological reflection; yet according to Heidegger, both Aristotle and Descartes
derived their metaphysics from a limited or shallow notion of being, mistakenly elevating one

1

In musicology, counterpoint describes a relationship between two or more musical lines which are
independent in rhythm and melodic contour, yet which remain harmonically interdependent. The
ambivalent independence of a contrapuntal line or voice captures nicely the relation between Heidegger’s
system and those he critiques: precisely insofar as his positive vision emerges through a gesture of
negation and an emphasis on difference, Heidegger’s work cannot be said to be fully independent of prior
metaphysics. As we shall see, there is a strong sense in which Heideggerian deconstruction builds, while
incorporating and preserving that which is negated.
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particular sort of being to the level of a paradigm or archetype to which all beings should
correspond.

Prior Meanings of Being
Due to his sustained engagement with the history of Western metaphysics, an outline of
the prior meanings of being is requisite to an understanding of Heidegger’s critical project and a
sophisticated appreciation of his ontology. Indeed, the novelty and stakes of his metaphysics will
be lost on a reader unfamiliar with the tradition it calls to task. Heidegger works from the
supposition that Aristotelian and Cartesian thought circumscribe modern ontological reflection
and discourse—that is, it is nearly impossible to pose ontological questions without
incorporating Aristotelian or Cartesian assumptions. In order to pose the “question of being”
anew, Heidegger insists that we must think beyond—which is not to say wholly reject—Aristotle
and Descartes (Heidegger, 2010, p. 22). To do so, however, we must first familiarize ourselves
with their thought and their discourse. This section hence reconstructs Aristotelian and Cartesian
metaphysics, which appear as privileged objects of Heidegger’s critique in Being and Time’s first
Division.
At the most general level, one can discern two accounts of being in the Aristotelian
corpus—a substantialist account and a hylomorphic account. The former is developed in
Aristotle’s Categories; the latter is in the Physics. In the Categories—traditionally considered
the first work of the Organon2—Aristotle endeavored to discern the basic “categories” required
to think or talk about anything. He proposed ten such categories, which correspond more or less
That is, Aristotle’s collected works on logic, comprising six volumes. According to convention, the
order of the works, with the corresponding Bekker numbering, is as follows: Categories (1a), On
Interpretation (16a), Prior Analytics (24a), Posterior Analytics (71a), Topics (100a), On Sophistical
Refutations (164a).
2
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precisely to various parts of speech. The first category is substance (οὐσία), which Aristotle
distinguishes in its “primary” and “secondary” modes (Aristotle, 1991a, p. 4 [2a13-2a18]).
Primary substances are what we tend to think of as entities, or things—Aristotle gives the
example of an individual man or an individual horse—whereas secondary substances are types of
entities—Aristotle called them “species”—as distinct from entities themselves. “The species in
which the things primarily called substances are,” Aristotle writes, “are called secondary
substances, as also are the genera of these species. […] [T]he individual man belongs in a
species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these—both man and animal—are called
secondary substances” (Aristotle, 1991a, p. 4 [2a13-2a18], italics added). Both primary and
secondary substances possess being, according to Aristotle—both are real—and in either case
meaningful propositions can be formulated in which substance—whether primary or
secondary—occupies the subject position (Aristotle, 1991a, p. 6 [3b10-3b23]).
Aristotle suggested that quality or attribute (ποιότης) was another fundamental category
(Aristotle, 1991a, p. 15 [8b25-8b26]). Substances necessarily have attributes, and a thing without
attributes is hardly conceivable. For Aristotle, attributes possess being, as do substances—they
too are real—but the being of attributes is, in a certain sense, derivative of the being of
substance. Hardness is a real attribute of a desk, for instance, yet hardness in itself, bereft of a
substance in which it inheres, cannot be said to exist or take a share in being. A desk bereft of
hardness would surely be a lousy desk—perhaps it wouldn’t be a desk at all—yet as substance, it
would continue to be, and attributes other than hardness would necessarily inhere in it. Lending
ontological priority to substance, Aristotle implied a pluralistic ontology which would be
thematized in Heidegger; yet, as we shall see, the ontological priority accorded to substance
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came to exert a profound influence on the history of Western metaphysics—and this influence,
Heidegger believed, eclipsed and distorted our understanding of being.
Substantialism, the metaphysics of the Categories, was not Aristotle’s only contribution
to the history of Western ontology. The account of being most often associated with his name in
fact diverges from the one offered in this early volume. Aristotle expounded his later,
“hylomorphic” account of being in order to overcome an apparently intractable problem arising
within the simple, predicative relationship between substances and attributes which characterizes
substantialist metaphysics. Aristotle observed that existing things change, which is explicable in
terms of their attributes in a substantialist framework: change occurs when a substance
exchanges one attribute or set of attributes for another (Aristotle, 1991a, pp. 15, 16 [8b27-9a9,
9a29-9b9]). But things are also generated and destroyed, and as Aristotle saw clearly in his
Physics, genesis and destruction pose an aporia for substantialist ontology, in so far as being and
non-being can only be conceived as attributes within its terms (Aristotle, 1991b, pp. 80-81, 120
[225a1-225a19; 225a35-225a36; 245b9-246a9]). To say that non-being inheres as an attribute in
a thing is a paradox, and this unavoidable paradox led Aristotle to revise his account of being.
Hylomorphic ontology does not abandon the notion of substance, it qualifies it. Here,
substance is distinguished as matter (ὕλη) composed or arranged under a certain form (μορφή)
(Aristotle, 1991b, p. 23 [194b9]). Hylomorphic ontology transcends the aporia faced by
substantialist ontology by proposing that the material substrate which undergoes changes such as
genesis and destruction is not substance but matter, and the thing lost or gained is not attribute
but form (Aristotle, 1991b, p. 13 [190a9-190a31]). When substance—a complex, articulated
thing composed of form and matter—is destroyed, it undergoes a process of decomposition
whereby the matter remains but the form is effaced. Because matter is not itself substance, this
43
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account reconciles substantialist ontology with our lived experience, an experience in which
entities indeed go out of and come into existence.
Up to this point, one could have said that the preeminent meaning of being in Aristotle is
substance. Yet with the advent of the hylomorphic account, substances come into being by virtue
of the formal composition of matter, and the concept of form thus achieves a sort of priority in
Aristotle’s later metaphysics. What it is for a thing to be a substance is to be a substance
endowed with a form, and when a substance loses its form it loses its existence qua substance. If
my desk is destroyed in a fire, its being is lost due to the absolute elimination of its formal
properties—it is reduced to ashes. Yet precisely these ashes demonstrate that matter persists,
under a different form, even when substance is destroyed. In Book II of the Physics, Aristotle
links the form of a thing to its function; many things, he observes, assume the forms they do to
perform a given task. (Aristotle, 1991b, p. 23 [194b27-194b29]). Consider a desk, or a bodily
organ: each of these has a physical composition tightly linked to what it does. Both form and
function are in this way linked by Aristotle to a thing’s purpose (τέλος), i.e., what a thing is for
or that for the sake of which it has the form that it does. If a desk was for digging, rather than
sitting behind, it would surely have a different form; and if a heart was for gastrointestinal
digestion rather than pulmonary circulation, it too would have a different physical composition.
While Aristotle’s reasoning may seem exact—and it surely holds in certain cases—the
limitations of hylomorphism as a metaphysical position are significant. Due to the imbrication of
the concepts outlined above—form, function, and purpose (τέλος)—one must conclude that
hylomorphism is, at bottom, a metaphysics of the functional object. Put differently, Aristotle
failed to consider that things worthy of metaphysical description may exist that for all that lack
functions or purposes. Because on his view all material beings are substances in which form
44
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(μορφή) and purpose (τέλος) are tightly linked with being itelf, Aristotle was forced to consider
human beings, like all things, as entities endowed with a final purpose—which he defined in the
Nichomachean Ethics as εὐδαιμονία, or human flourishing according to the good (Aristotle,
2000, p. 5 [1095a]). Taking a certain sort of thing—functional things—as a paradigm of being
itself, Aristotle was incapable of properly analyzing the ontological structure of things without
τέλη, or purposes.
* * *
Alongside Aristotle, René Descartes stands as a key object of Heidegger’s critique in
Division One of Being and Time. In the ontology developed across his Discourse on Method,
Meditations on First Philosophy, and Principles of Philosophy, Descartes drew heavily on the
views of the early Aristotle, or a substantialism in which entities primarily figure as bearers of
attributes. Significantly, Descartes would adapt Aristotle’s typology of attributes—developed in
the Categories—to make a novel distinction between “principle” and “dependent” attributes of
things; the first was a constitutive feature of a thing, where the second was merely accidental.
The notion of a “principle attribute” led Descartes to posit a categorical distinction between two
classes things—res cogitans and res extensa, or mental and extended substances. The principle
attribute of the first is thought; of the second, corporality (Descartes 2003, p. 98). In this way, the
schema of Aristotelian substantialism, in which the world is composed of many classes of being,
would be dramatically reduced by Descartes to two: the ideal and the material, which are, with
regard to one another, wholly discrete. “Examining what we are,” Descartes wrote, “we clearly
perceive that neither extension, nor figure, nor existence in any place […] nor anything similar
that can be attributed to body, pertains to our nature, and nothing save thought alone” (Descartes,
2003, p. 59, see also p. 98). Cartesian dualism thus hypostatized a rigid divide between subjects
45
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and objects: the objective world of res extensa became ontologically distinct from the ‘I’ of
mental substance, while all thought, sensation, and experience was conceived in terms of
attributes inhering in the cogitating ‘I.’
Following the division between principal and dependent attributes, Descartes would
introduce a further distinction, marking off those attributes which could be described by
euclidian geometry—conceived in terms of abstract extension—from those which are grounded
in sense perception. “Extension in length, breadth, and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal
substance,” Descartes wrote, here affirming that the world of bodily objects is, ipso facto, an
abstract domain of calculable space. As a rationalist, Descartes held up geometrical knowledge
as an epistemological ideal:
[Having examined] all the clear and distinct notions of material things that are to be found in
our understanding, and […], finding no others except those of figures, magnitudes, and
motions, and of the rules according to which these three things can be diversified by each
other, which rules are the principles of geometry and mechanics, I judged that all the
knowledge man can have of nature must of necessity be drawn from this source; because all
the other notions we have of sensible things, as confused and obscure, can be of no avail in
affording us the knowledge of anything out[side] of ourselves, but must serve rather to
impede it (Descartes, 2003, p. 177, italics added).
Descartes categorically transposed attributes grounded in sense perception—such as taste and
smell, as well as value and meaning—into the domain of the subject. According to this view,
such qualities do not describe the world as res extensa, but are mere attributes inhering in mental
substance, or abstract subjectivity.3
The substantialist metaphysics of Descartes roots itself in a rejection of Aristotelian
hylomorphism—one following from the preeminent position held by the concept of function in

3

Significantly, precedent for such a distinction can be found in Aristotle himself, who, in the Categories,
distinguished among qualities to isolate those “affective” qualities—such as color—which follow not
from an “affectation” in or of the substance in question, but instead affect our sensory perception of that
substance. See Aristotle, 1991a, p. 16 [9b10-9b19].
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Aristotle’s mature thought. Emerging at the threshold of modernity from a medieval Scholastic
tradition where function was tightly linked to the idea of ascription, Descartes tended to view
things in themselves as functionless. Where function was naturalized in Aristotle, it was typical
of the New Science championed by Descartes to view function as conceivable only in terms of
subjective or divine attribution: without an ascribing subject, all things were without purpose
and, therefor, intrinsically functionless (Smith, 2018). To the extent that the function of a thing
could be said to take a share in being, this was purely a mental phenomenon—like taste, smell, or
meaning—imprisoned in the formless void of the cogitating ‘I.’
Descartes’ claim that geometrical description amounts to the most indubitable—and
hence fundamental—way of apprehending or describing the world was profoundly disconcerting
to Heidegger. Does this not represent a cold, mathematizing interpretation of being? Here, no
thing can be said to be said to bear objective significance, since meaning is categorically
excluded from the mathematical or natural scientific level of description (Heidegger, 2010, pp.
88-89). On the other hand, Aristotle’s mature ontology was grasped by Heidegger as a
metaphysics in which the functional object was falsely privileged as a paradigm for all things—
and ultimately for being itself. In Heidegger’s estimation, then, the horizon of Western
metaphysics presents itself in a janus-faced aspect: within this tradition, the meaning of being
has been systematically distorted and violently reduced—to the teleological being of the
functional object or the abstract and vacuous being of substance.

Toward a Fundamental Ontology
It is against the backdrop of these two tendencies—Aristotelian hylomorphism on the one
hand and Cartesian substantialism on the other—that Heidegger develops his “fundamental
47
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ontology” in Being and Time (Heidegger, 2010, p. 13). According to Heidegger, Aristotle had
mistakenly linked function, and hence purpose, to being as such; yet in Heidegger’s view neither
function nor τέλος can be necessary conditions of being, since human beings—the very beings
for whom being is a consideration—lack functions or purposes.4 On the other hand, the thrust of
Cartesian ontology divests corporeal existence of significance, making meaning utterly
subjective and the world a kind of cold, calculable waste. This perspective, Heidegger suggests,
fails to accord with the constitutive and intersubjective character of meaning as encountered in
the world, and diverges in the most radical ways from the horizon of actual experience. Both
Aristotelian and Cartesian ontology eclipse our view of being.
Division One of Being and Time elaborates a “fundamental ontology” which charts a
decidedly different trajectory than that traced by prior metaphysics. Employing a novel method
of phenomenological description, Heidegger arrives at an entirely new breed of metaphysics—
one he believes to be critically positioned vis-à-vis the ontological systems handed down by the
Western philosophical tradition. As a phenomenologist, Heidegger distances himself from prior
metaphysics in his insistence on the necessity of describing everyday experience, or “average
everydayness” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 16). As Thomas Kalary observes, Heidegger’s
phenomenological approach grounds “philosophy as a pre-theoretical primordial science” which
can be “enacted only through an explication” of the basic structures of “factic life” (faktische

Heidegger’s polemical claim that human beings are essentially purposeless should not be conflated with
a nihilistic one, whereby individual human life cannot be lived with intention and meaning. On the
contrary, Division Two of Being and Time explicates Heidegger’s normative guidelines for “authentic”
existence within the strictures of factical human life. Heidegger’s point here, in Division One, is that the
human being—or, more specifically, Dasein—lacks any generic purpose simply on the basis of its
inclusion in the category of being to which it belongs. Where a potter’s wheel has a specified purpose
simply by virtue of its being a potter’s wheel—and arguably, the same could be said to hold for an
uninvented thing, like a tree’s leaves or a red blood cell—a human being, qua human being, is neither
functional nor purposive.
48
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Leben) (Kalary, 2012, p. 181). Whereas Descartes’s meditative method rested upon his ability to
divorce himself from the world of the everyday, Heidegger emphasizes the centrality of that
world to any account of being as such. This is not to say that everything to be known about being
is immediately grasped in a pre-reflexive manner, for as Heidegger notes, fundamental ontology
as revealed by phenomenological inquiry is “far removed from what is accessible to the preontological understanding of being” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 177). Still, it is Heidegger’s view that
an accurate description of the constitutive structures of everyday experience will furnish an
ontology of the being whose everyday experience is so described. The overarching thrust of
Being and Time is to arrive at this descriptive account.
The everyday experience Heidegger undertakes to define in Being and Time unfolds from
the perspective of a being Heidegger calls Dasein. A common German noun often translated as
“existence,” the term composes the noun Sein, “being,” and the prefix da-, signifying “there.”
The type of being uncovered by Heideggerian fundamental ontology is thus not abstract but
concrete, always situated in a particular locus, or “world.”5 Due to the technical specificity with
which Heidegger invests the term Dasein, recent translators of his work tend to leave it
untranslated; and, because the whole of Division One of Being and Time can be seen as offering
a sustained, probing, and idiosyncratic definition of the term, one can hardly adduce a
comprehensive, sloganistic definition. Provisionally, though, one can say with confidence that
Dasein refers to the sort or the way of being that human beings fundamentally partake in or
have, though it is by no means explicit that Dasein is restricted to human beings.6

5

It is significant that, terminologically, this locus is undivided from the very being (Sein) fundamental
ontology describes. As we shall see, it is absolutely central to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein that this
genre of being is wholly inseparable from the world in which it is given. This is in sharp contrast to the
Cartesian view, cited above, that mental substances are essentially non-spatial.
6
Heidegger offers somewhat equivocal remarks regarding the extent to which creatures other than
humans could be ontologically embraced by Dasein. In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” an essay
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Undertaking a fundamental ontology from the standpoint of Dasein, Heidegger commits
himself to an ontological pluralism, distinguishing Dasein from “other beings” which have
features other than those constitutive of Dasein (Heidegger, 2010, p. 11). This heterogeneity of
being raises two immediate concerns. First, if Heidegger wants to pose the “question of being”
sans phrase, as he claims, why does he take a particular sort of being, Dasein, as his starting
point? To justify this choice, Heidegger makes two distinct claims. First, he observes that Dasein
is that which is “ontically ‘nearest’” to us (Heidegger, 2010, p. 16). As the sort of being that we
ourselves are or have, Dasein is the genre of being with which we are most intimately familiar,
and hence the one we have the best shot at describing accurately. Ultimately, this claim rests on
Heidegger’s conviction that fundamental ontology will be revealed through phenomenological
description, a procedure of self-disclosure which cannot be performed for a being other than the
one we ourselves are. Secondly, Heidegger claims that Dasein is a being “essentially concerned
about its being,” for whom a “pre-ontological understanding of being” is an “essential tendency”
(Heidegger, 2010, pp. 11 and 13). As beings fundamentally predisposed to ontological reflection,
and always already endowed with a working definition of being, Dasein is, as it were, given to us
as a foundation for ontological inquiry.7

published in 1950 but drafted between 1937 and 1939, a decade after the initial publication of Being and
Time, Heidegger describes both plants an animals as existing with “no world.” (“World,” as we shall see,
is perhaps the most fundamental structure of Dasein according to the analysis of Being and Time.) By
contrast, in a series of lectures delivered in 1929, Heidegger describes non-human animals as “poor in
world” or existing within a fundamental “poverty of world” (Weltarmut). See Heidegger, 1971, p. 43;
Heidegger, 1995, p. 263. See also Agamben, 2004, pp. 49-73.
7
While Heidegger is right that these constitute excellent reasons to undertake a philosophical
investigation of Dasein, a profound unclarity persists concerning the way a fundamental ontology of this
particular sort of being is to furnish an answer to the “question of being” as such. In works subsequent to
Being and Time, such as the lecture series The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger will
argue that it is only to Dasein that being is revealed or “disclosed” as such. Whereas non-human animals
encounter the objects in their environments as pure particulars, Heidegger argues that only human beings
discover in such particulars the instantiation of being (Sein) itself, or encounter these particulars as
beings. (This claim dovetails with Heidegger’s assertion, in the same lectures, that non-human animals
are fundamentally “poor in world”; see footnote 7, above). Yet, even if Dasein is the being to whom
50

Pierce

On the Deconstruction of Metaphysics: Heidegger’s Critical Ontology in Being and Time

If other ways or sorts of being are fundamentally heterogenous with respect to Dasein, as
Heidegger claims, one could raise a second objection: Does Heidegger not lapse into the same
genre of dualism for which he rebukes Descartes? Does he simply posit a new sort of subject
indelibly cleaved off from its object? Answering this question takes us to the heart of the
Heideggerian analysis of Dasein, and demonstrates the depth of Heidegger’s critical divergence
from Descartes. Heideggerian pluralism parts ways with the Cartesian division between res
cogitans and res extensa, for where Descartes finds mental substances radically distinct from res
extensa—and hence, inevitably skeptical as regards the latter—Heidegger presents Dasein as
always already “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 53). The world in which Dasein finds
itself is is not ontologically distinct from, but is rather a constitutive ontological structure of
Dasein. Always already known to Dasein, or familiar, the world forms an essential element in
the ontological explication of Dasein as a unique sort or way of being. Dasein, for this reason, is
never given apart from the world, and cannot be known except in and through its imbrication
with all things worldly (Heidegger, 2010, pp. 59-62). If Dasein is, in the most fundamental
sense, constituted in and through the world in which it is given, this represents a view of being at
antipodes with the model of Cartesian dualism.
Embedded in its world, Dasein is a being essentially “concerned” with things—objects
and practical engagements (Heidegger, 2010, p. 96). Far from being an immaterial spectator of
its material environment, Dasein is fundamentally involved in and engaged with the things
around it. The world is made up of objects Dasein touches, employs, and knows, and these
objects are certainly not best described geometrically, as mere “objectively-present” entities

being itself is fundamentally revealed, as Heidegger suggests, this hardly furnishes us with a bridge
between the fundamental ontology of Dasein and a fundamental ontology without qualification. See
Heidegger, 1995, p. 263.
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bereft of meaning (Vorhandene) (Heidegger, 2010, p. 96). On the contrary, the world
encountered by Dasein is a world invested with significance, a world comprised of vast networks
of meaningful things “ready-to-hand” (Zuhandene) (Heidegger, 2010, p. 67). Emphasizing the
everyday and the tactile, Heidegger notes that “the closest kind of dealing is not mere perceptual
cognition,” as Descartes would have it, but is rather “a handling, using, and taking care”
(Heidegger, 2010, p. 67). In other words, Dasein’s most basic or fundamental reality is surely not
skeptical, or even speculative, but is rather rooted in pre-philosophical, pragmatic encounters
with things in the world. Cartesian skepticism concerning the “demonstrability of the external
world” is unintelligible from the standpoint of an investigation which presupposes being-in-theworld and average everydayness as its foundation (Heidegger, 2010, pp. 77-83, cf. 195).
By emphasizing the practical, the everyday, and the worldly, Heidegger shows that the
Cartesian interpretation of the world as res extensa is not false, but is wholly derivative of a more
fundamental or “primordial” experience of the world—which is always pragmatically
encountered and invested with meaning. Dasein as being-in-the-world is, at the most
fundamental level, being in a meaningful environment made up of useful objects. Only on the
basis of such a world—which is always already “disclosed” or accessible in itself to Dasein in
the latter’s pragmatic and meaningful dealings—can a scientistic view of things as mere
objective presence (Vorhandenheit) arise (Heidegger, 2010, p. 195). In this way, Heidegger does
not so much reject Cartesian ontology as bracket and reverse it. Where Descartes takes the
mathematically describable character of res extensa to be the an objective bedrock against which
subjective experience and meaning-generation emerge, Heidegger sees this scientistic view as a
narrow, parochial description of things which can only be produced on the basis of a more
primordial experience of being-in-the-world. “Da-sein,” Heidegger writes, “is primordially
52
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familiar with that within which it understands itself […]. This familiarity with the world does not
necessarily require a theoretical transparency of the relations constituting the world as world. But
it is probable that the possibility of an explicit ontological […] interpretation of these relations is
grounded in the familiarity of the world constitutive for Da-sein” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 81). The
primordial condition of Dasein’s being-in-the-world is the real foundation upon which
theoretical or philosophical insights may be built.
Following Aristotle, Heidegger’s analysis of “world” (Welt) and the “handiness”
(Zuhandenheit) of things underscores the importance of functional and purposive objects to
ontological inquiry. Yet Dasein is not itself reducible to description in terms of function or
τέλος, since Heidegger, like Descartes, sees the functions of things as dependent upon Dasein.
However, for Heidegger, contra Descartes, ascriptions of function and meaning are not
individual subjective acts. Rather, they are collectively generated and sustained in socio-cultural,
historical, and pragmatic practices to which Dasein, as a “factical” being, is always already given
over: the world in which Dasein finds itself is one where meanings and purposes for things have
always already been established (Heidegger, 2010, p. 61). The desk at which I am writing isn’t
for sitting at rather than for digging a trench simply because I decide this. Rather, I encounter the
desk as a place for sitting; this is, after all, what the desk is. As indubitable features of sociocultural reality, meanings and purposes for things are objective features of the world, on
Heidegger’s view. That the avant garde artist may display a urinal as a work of art, excerpting it
from its functional mode of being and assigning it a new purpose and meaning from whole cloth
is no exception. On the contrary, the jarring and confounding presence of this object in a gallery,
and the scandal its presence provokes, serve to underscore Heidegger’s point: the meanings of
objects are so deeply socially codified—are indeed objective features of the social world—that
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any attempt to change these meanings may appear as a sort of violence directed at the social
order.8
While Heidegger’s stance vis-à-vis Cartesian thought is often polemical, his critical
engagement with—and appropriation of—Aristotle is significantly more nuanced. Of
Heidegger’s indebtedness to Aristotle, Martin Wheeler writes, “Aristotle’s demand in the
Metaphysics to know what it is that unites all possible modes of Being […] is, in many ways, the
question that ignites and drives Heidegger’s philosophy,” while Thomas Sheehan observes that
“Aristotle appears directly or indirectly on virtually every page” of Being and Time (Wheeler,
2011; Sheehan, 1975, p. 87). Heidegger engaged extensively with Aristotle, lecturing on
Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle in 1921-22, on the Basic Concepts of Aristotelian
Philosophy in 1924, and on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Θ1-3 in 1931; across these lectures,
Heidegger clarified his own philosophical vision via an extended dialogue with Aristotelian
thought.
Notwithstanding the complexity of this intellectual engagement, many of the criticisms
Heidegger explicitly addresses to Cartesian substantialism apply, tacitly, to Aristotle’s
hylomorphic metaphysics. As we have seen, Heidegger, like Aristotle, brings purposive and
functional objects to the foreground of his analysis, yet he distances himself from Aristotle by
rejecting the view that the being of the functional object can act as an archetype for being as
such. At a more profound level, Aristotle’s entire approach to metaphysics diverges sharply from
Heidegger’s, precisely due to the latter’s commitment to fundamental ontology as
phenomenological explication of Dasein’s everyday being-in-the-world. By contrast, Aristotelian
hylomorphic ontology is, precisely, a metaphysical theory: it deduces objects which are never
This example gestures towards the culturally conservative politics tacitly lurking beneath Heidegger’s
account of being and world. See Rosner, 2009.
8
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perceived or experienced in isolation—matter and form—from our real experiences of things,
specifically things which are generated and destroyed. Heideggerian fundamental ontology, on
the other hand, offers a clarification or elucidation of the basic pre-theoretical structures of being
as Dasein. In the same manner than Cartesian skepticism and a calculating comportment towards
existence can only arise on the basis of a more fundamental experience of “being-in-the-world,”
Aristotelian hylomorphism presupposes a more basic experience as its condition of possibility,
but this experience remains unthought within its parameters.
This experience and its basic structures emerged as Heidegger’s central objects of inquiry
in Being and Time. Situated at a deeper level than that charted by either Aristotle or Descartes—
a level prior metaphysics overlooked due to its quotidian character—Heidegger’s analytic of
Dasein is, strictly speaking, a fundamental ontology.

Conclusion
On Heidegger’s view, both Aristotle and Descartes used the wrong sort of model as the basis for
their ontology. For Descartes, mental substances exist completely divorced from a world made
up of objectively present things (Vorhandene), despite all phenomenological evidence to the
contrary. And for Aristotle, human beings are not essentially different from other entities, and
can thus be defined in terms of τέλος, or purpose. For both figures, metaphysics should properly
go beyond quotidian experience—furnishing an ontological theory of the latter—yet in this
gesture, metaphysics fails to interrogate its own conditions of possibility. Describing Dasein by
means of a phenomenology of the everyday, Heidegger hoped to avoid this error handed down
by the history of Western metaphysics: such was the project of fundamental ontology, which
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Heidegger also regarded as a “destruction” (Destruktion) of the Western metaphysical tradition
(Heidegger, 2010, p. 37).
Being and Time’s first Division unearths a pluralistic ontology in which Dasein shows up
as one entity among many. No single ontological description can encompass all things, in
Heidegger’s view, and the history of Western ontology has done violence to this simple fact. Yet
Heidegger does not simply reject prior ontological systems. His complex engagement with the
Western philosophical canon discloses how and why prior ontologists failed, and suggests that a
comprehensive ontology would make ample use of their insights. Aristotle’s hylomorphic
account of functional objects informs Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s practical dealings with
objects; and Heidegger accepts—perhaps begrudgingly—that a scientistic outlook indebted to
Descartes cannot be written off as simply wrong. Both of these interpretations of being find a
place in Heidegger’s structural analysis of Dasein; but they are both, at bottom, derivative of
Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
By formulating a fundamental ontology centering a particular being—Dasein—it is
ultimately unclear if Heidegger succeeds in transcending the deadlocks of prior metaphysics:
shadows of androcentrism and post-Kantian idealism linger at the margins of Heidegger’s
thought and his discourse. Even if Dasein is the being to whom being as such is revealed, as
Heidegger claims, he fails to specify how one can move from the ontological analysis of Dasein
to an investigation of being as such. If such a movement is somehow foreclosed to Dasein, one
could rightly ask, why? And if Dasein is the being who encounters being in beings, as Heidegger
insists, what form and content would an analytic of being as such assume? If these question
remain unanswered in his discourse, then perhaps Heidegger is finally right to suggest that
fundamental ontology illuminates the question—but not the answer—of the meaning of being
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(Heidegger, 2010, p. 37). Heidegger’s critical comportment toward canonical thought and the
project of prior ontology urges us to pose, again, that question.
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